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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
CARL WILKERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case Nos. 
16576 
and 
16577 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal represents two criminal cases: 
(1) forcible sodomy, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 
(1953), as amended, a first degree felony; and (2) forcible 
sexual abuse, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), as amended, 
a third degree felony. The cases have been consolidated 
for purposes of appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried in the Fourth District 
Court, Judge Kenneth G. Anderton, presiding, sitting without 
a jury. The charges were severed for purposes of trial, but 
each case was heard on June 6, 1979. The defendant was 
convicted on both offenses. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the verdict of the 
trial court judge should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Carl Wilkerson, is the 
grandfather of the victim, Nicole Wilkerson. The 
defendant res~des in Duchesne County, Utah. Nicole, 
age six, lives with her mother, Sandra May, and her 
stepfather, Robert May, in Maeser, Utah. Nicole's 
father, Glen Wilkerson, is the son of the defendant 
and also lives in Duchesne, Utah. During the sununer 
of 1977, Nicole spent a considerable amount of 
time with her father. In mid-September of 1977, 
Nicole went to visit her father, Glen Wilkerson, for 
several days while Sandra May and Robert May traveled 
to Lake Powell for vacation (T.53-54). 
On September 15, 1977, Glen Wilkerson took 
Nicole to stay with her grandparents. That evening, 
Nicole took a bath and went to the living room and 
sat on the couch with her grandfather, Carl Wilkerson. 
Nicole was not wearing clothes at the time, but was 
wrapped in an afghan blanket. During the time that Nicole 
was sitting on the couch with the defendant, the 
defendant committed an act of forcible sexual abuse on 
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the child by touching her genitals with his fingers 
(T.74,83). 
Six months after this incident, on February 
24, 1978, Nicole was again left with her father, Glen 
Wilkerson. Nicole's mother and stepfather had gone to 
Salt Lake City to compete in a horseracing event (T.54, 
154-155). Again, Nicole was taken by her father to 
stay with her grandfather, Carl Wilkerson, in Duchesne. 
This incident took place in the defendant's bedroom 
when the defendant touched the child's genitals with 
his tongue and fingers (T.44,132-133). 
The defendant was charged on June 5, 1978, 
in Duchesne County, with violating Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-404 (1953), as amended (forcible sexual abuse). 
This offense involved the incident on September 15, 1977. 
The defendant was also charged with violating Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-403 (1953), as amended (forcible sodomy with 
a person under the age of fourteen years). This offense 
involved the incident on February 24, 1978. Preliminary 
hearing was held on July 11, 1978, in the Justice of 
the Peace Court for Duchesne County, before c. Dean Powell, 
a Justice of the Peace, presiding. The trial in district 
court was held even months later, on June 6, 1979. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN RULING THAT A SIX YEAR OLD VICTIM 
WAS COMPETENT TO TESTIFY. 
The law in Utah requires that in order for 
a child under the age of ten years to testify in 
court there must be evidence that the child is 
competent to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-2 (1953), 
as amended. In determining the competence of such 
testimony, the court considers several factors: 
The testimony of a six year old 
child is not rendered completely 
incompetent nor entirely discredited 
solely because of her age. As we have 
previously observed, no particular age 
nor any specific standard of mental 
ability can be set as the qualification 
for giving testimony, but it is an 
important fact to be considered, along 
with others, in determining whether she 
should be allowed to testify. What is 
essential is that it appear that the 
child has sufficient intelligence and 
maturity that she is able to understand 
the questions put to her, that she has 
some knowledge of the subject under 
inquiry and the facts involved therein; 
that she is able to remember what 
happened; and that she has a sense of 
moral duty to tell the truth. Whether 
she meets these tests and is therefore 
a competent witness is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court to 
to determine. His ruling will not be 
-4-
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disturbed in the absence of a clear 
showing of abuse. State v. Smith, 
401 P.2d 445 at 447 (Utah 1965). 
(Emphasis added.) 
see also State v. Dickson, 114 Utah 301, 199 P.2d 775· 
(Utah 1948); State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361 
P.2d 174 (Utah 1961); State v. Zeizich, 61 Utah 61, 
210 P.2d 927 (Utah 1922); State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 
1272 (Utah 1975). The law in Utah gives the trial court 
substantial discretion to determine the competence of 
a child as a witness in court. 
In this case, there was sufficient evidence 
to establish that Nicole Wilkerson had a sense of moral 
duty to tell the truth; that she understood the questions 
put to her; and that she had some knowledge of the incident 
under investigation. Nicole testified in both cases that 
raising her right hand and taking an oath was significant 
and was important because it meant "to tell the truth." 
(T.66,127). The child said she knew the difference between 
telling the truth and telling a lie. Nicole said that 
telling a lie is "when you're making up a story" (T.66, 
127). The child said that it was wrong to tell a lie, 
and that she could get in trouble if she did so (T.66, 
70,127). 
In addition to her testimony concerning her 
duty to tell the truth, Nicole testified concerning her 
-5-
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age, birthday, and schooling. The child testified that 
she was almost eight years old at the time of trial and 
that her birthday was on July 27 (T.64,65,124). Nicole 
testified that she had been in the first grade last 
year and had just completed the second grade at the 
time of trial (T.65,124-125). The child testified that 
she attended school in Maeser, Utah, received good 
grades (T.124-125), and her teacher was Miss Johnson 
(T.125). She also testified that she was born in 
Roosevelt, Utah, and lived with her mother and step-
father, Robert May (T.65,126-127). Nicole also said 
she knew the trial was being held in 1979 (T.90). 
The child also demonstrated some knowledge 
of the facts and her capacity to remember what happened. 
Nicole was able to explain where the incidents 
occurred (T.72;133), who was present (T.132,73); and 
what she was doing before the incident (T.80). Nicole 
explained the events surrounding both charges. 
Based upon the testimony of Nicole Wilkerson, 
the trial court entered the following findings: 
The court was satisfied that the 
child had sufficient intelligence to 
understand the questions, that she had 
sufficient attitude to remember and 
relate relevant and material facts, 
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and that she had the ability to distinguish 
between truth and error, and to understand 
the nature of the oath. The evidence 
indicates that she was a good student in 
school. The court is cognizant of the 
fact that it was difficult for the child 
to remember certain time sequences and 
that she paused frequently before responding 
to questions. The court was convinced that 
the condition was caused by the lapse of 
time between the incident in question, the 
tender age of the child and the difficult 
subject in which the child was required 
to respond. The court holds that the 
child Nicole Wilkerson was qualified and 
competent to testify. (T.41) 
Based on the evidence and testimony contained 
in the record, respondent submits that the trial court 
did not err in ruling that Nicole Wilkerson, age six, 
was competent to testify in the case. The trial 
court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion but was 
based on substantial evidence introduced at the 
trial. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF BOTH 
CHARGES. 
The rule governing a claim of insufficient 
evidence on appeal is that the evidence and all 
inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom must be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict. 
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). 
-7-
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In order to convict the defendant of the 
charge of forcible sodomy pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-403 (1953), as amended, the court must find 
that the defendant engaged in a sexual act involving 
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of 
another person. Additionally, the court must find 
that the victim is under the age of fourteen. The 
evidence in the record and the inferences drawn from 
the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, are as follows: Nicole Wilkerson said that 
at the time of this incident she had been left with 
her grandfather while her mother went to Salt Lake 
City to attend a horseracing event. The defendant took 
her to his bedroom, had her disrobe (T.139), and engaged 
in a sexual act involving her genitals and his mouth. 
The child testified that the defendant placed "his 
tongue where I go to the bathroom" (T.132-133). 
In addition to the testimony of Nicole Wilkerson, 
the State called Sandra May. Mrs. May was called by the 
State in order to corroborate the child'. s testimony. Mrs. 
May testified that her daughter told her about the incident 
involving the defendant (T.159). The conversation between 
Mrs. May and Nicole took place in April, 1978. 
The second charge involved the crime of forcible 
sexual abuse. In order for the court to convict the defendr 
-8-
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of the charge of forcible sexual abuse pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), as amended, there must be 
a finding that the defendant touched the genitals of 
another or took indecent liberties with that person 
and that there was an intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain or to do so with the intent 
to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of another 
person. The evidence in the record and the inferences 
drawn from the record concerning the charge of forcible 
sexual abuse which occurred on or about September 15, 
1977, are as follows: Nicole Wilkerson testified that 
after taking a bath, she had gone into the living room 
and sat on the couch with the defendant. Nicole 
Wilkerson was not wearing clothes but wrapped in an 
afghan. During the time she was on the couch, the 
defendant "put his fingers where I go to the bathroom." 
(T.74,83). Nicole said that this act hurt or caused 
some discomfort (T.83,88). 
In addition to the testimony of Nicole 
Wilkerson, the State called Douglas Horrock, Chief of 
Police for Duchesne County, who testified in rebuttal 
concerning a conversation he had with the defendant. 
The conversation involved the charges and allegations 
brought by Nicole Wilkerson. The defendant told 
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Officer Horrock that he had a "problem" and had 
contacted a psychiatrist to eliminate the problem 
(T.118). The defendant also told Officer Horrock 
that if Nicole had been injured, he would pay for 
any psychiatric help which the child required (T.118). 
Although the charges are based almost 
entirely on the testimony of Nicole Wilkerson, the 
trial court was at liberty to judge the weight and 
credibility of her testimony. The decision to give 
Nicole's testimony significant weight and credibility 
was within the prerogative of the trial court and 
should not be reversed unless there is evidence of 
an abuse of discretion. The record fails to disclose 
that her testimony was either incompetent or 
inadmissible. 
This Court ruled in State v. Smith, supra, 
that a conviction may be obtained on the testimony 
of the child alone: 
In this connection, it must be 
borne in mind that when such an offense 
is committed, it is done with the 
greatest possible stealth and secrecy, 
so that most often the testimony of the 
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victim, coupled with the type of 
corroboration we have here, is the 
only evidence available upon which to 
determine guilt or innocence. The 
fact that there is difficulties involved 
should not prevent the processes of 
justice from functioning. The resolution 
of disputes is the purpose for which 
courts and juries exist, and they must 
perform their duties in spite of such 
difficulties. Both trial judges and 
jurors are aware of the various con-
siderations involved in such a situation. 
For these reasons they invariably approach 
cases of this character with caution as 
the trial court appropriately instructed 
the jury here. Id. at 447. 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
THE DATE AND TIME OF BOTH OFFENSES. 
The purpose of pleadings in a complaint or 
information is to put the defendant on notice as to 
the contents of the offense and also to set forth the date 
and time of such offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-8 
(1953), as amended. However, this Court has held 
that the time or date of the offense may or may not be 
critical or important as an element for conviction. 
In State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 (Utah 
1949), the defendant was prosecuted for an indecent 
assault upon a child. One of the issues on appeal 
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involved the date and time of the offense. In reference 
to that issue, the Supreme Court said: 
In this case, ±he act with which 
defendant was charged was sufficiently 
identified and singled out by the locus 
of the offense, and the particular 
circumstances surrounding it, viz., that 
it was conunitted upon the person of 
Doral Elder in the front seat of defendant's 
car, while Ferrell Sorenson was sitting in 
the rear seat. For aught that appears in 
the record, there can be no danger of 
double jeopardy to this defendant, even 
though the state's evidence points to 
a crime committed some ten days before 
the alleged date of the information. In 
this connection, we said in State v. 
Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 262 P. 113, 116: 
"It is therefore well 
established in this jurisdiction 
that where time is not of the 
essence of the crime, the exact 
time is immaterial, and if the 
evidence otherwise supports the 
charge relied upon by the prosecu-
tion, a conviction may not be set 
aside because the crime was corrunitted 
after the date charged in the 
information or indictment, so long 
as it was corrunitted prior to the 
bringing of the prosecution." 
see also the concurring opinion of 
Mr. Justice Straup, wherein it was said: 
"It undoubtedly is true that 
the State in the first instance 
is not bound by or confined to the 
exact date stated in the 
information. It may elect to 
prove the charged offense at 
any time prior to the filing of 
the information and within the 
statute of limitations; . " 
Id. at 770 (emphasis added). 
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In this case, the acts or offenses for which 
the defendant was charged were sufficiently identified 
and singled out so that the defendant could be given 
notice of the particular offenses. 
The forcible sexual abuse charge occurred 
on or about September 15, 1977. Nicole Wilkerson testified 
that the incident took place "just after swnmer" while she 
was staying with her father, Glen Wilkerson, and while her 
mother was at Lake Powell (T.75-76). Nicole testified 
that her father had taken her to the defendant's house 
prior to the incident occurring (T.75). 
Robert May testified that Nicole Wilkerson had 
been left with her father while he and Nicole's mother went 
to Lake Powell during the "second or third week" in 
September of 1977 (T.98). The testimony of Robert May 
corroborated the testimony of the victim and also 
sufficiently identified the time of the incident. 
Although Nicole Wilkerson testified that 
this incident occurred in 1978 and although this testimony 
was in error, the child testified that the incident occurred 
prior to her testimony at the preliminary hearing (T.90). 
The preliminary hearing was held on July 11, 1978. Based 
on the date of the preliminary hearing and the date of the 
trip to Lake Powell, the incident could not have occurred 
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in 1978, but rather occurred in 1977. 
The offense involving forcible sodomy occurred 
on or about February 24, 1978. Nicole Wilkerson 
testified that this offense also occurred at the 
defendant's home while she was in the defendant's 
bedroom. Nicole testified that the incident occurred 
at a time when her mother "Had a horse trailer with 
her on the back of a truck" (T.132,153). Although 
the child testified that she thought the incident 
occurred "before Christmas, I think" (T.136), she 
said the incident occurred at a time when her father, 
Glen Wilkerson, had taken her to the defendant's house 
(T.137). 
Robert May, Nicole's stepfather, testified 
that Nicole had visited with her father, Glen Wilkerson, 
in Duchesne on only one occasion between December, 1977, 
and February, 1978. That visit occurred during the 
"third weekend" in February, 1978 (T.154-155). Mr. May 
testified that he had dropped Nicole off at Glen 
Wilkerson's home because he was planning to attend 
horseraces in Salt Lake City. May said at 
the time he left Nicole with her father, he was driving 
a pickup with a horsetrailer attached to the truck 
(T.155). 
-14-
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Donna Wilkerson, wife of the defendant, was 
called to testify for the defendant and said that Nicole 
may have been with the defendant in February, 1978 
(T.167). Sandra May, the victim's mother, testified 
that Nicole told her about the February incident in 
April, 1978 (T.159). 
The testimony of Robert May, Sandra May, 
Nicole Wilkerson, and Donna Wilkerson was sufficient 
to identify the time of the incident. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence introduced at trial and 
the case law submitted herein, respondent requests 
that the verdict of the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ERNIE JONES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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